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My view on Owen Fiss's paper on the rise of judicial bureaucracy in
the administrative state is the traditional perspective of a federal judge. At
least two other perspectives are possible. Professor Mashaw believes that
in controlling the administrative state, federal courts, when not "imperti-
nent," are "irrelevant."1 Professor Mashaw's position is interesting, but it
is not one that I can take seriously as an Article III judge. The stereotypi-
cal judicial bureaucrat, in contrast, believes that he should be a "manage-
rial judge."2 Professor Fiss fears that this latter viewpoint may come to
dominate judicial thinking. I will start with the viewpoint of this consum-
mate judicial bureaucrat, explain my own view, and end with a suggested
method for handling section 1983 and similar cases against state and local
officials, which are the major source of judicial bureaucratization.
I.
In reply to Owen Fiss, my interlocutor, a phantom colleague on the
federal district court bench, dissents as follows:
My job on the district court is operational, not conceptual. I have
seven hundred cases on my trial docket. One hundred are complex
cases with extensive discovery, in which protective and many other
kinds of orders must be entered and lengthy pretrial conferences con-
ducted. Without management the trials will take forever; lawyers at
$200 an hour will try to depose everyone in sight and rifle through
thousands of document files. In several other cases, I am supervising,
after trial and judgment, the management of a school, a prison, a
hospital, and several corporations. In ten others, a party is seeking
immediate injunctive relief. Fifty are criminal cases awaiting ar-
raignment, trial, or sentencing with bail and discovery motions, sup-
pression hearings, and probation office work to be overseen. I have
t Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
1. Mashaw, "Rights" in the Federal Administrative State, 92 YALE L.J. 1129 (1983).
2. See Resnick, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 (1982) (discussion of managerial tasks
of federal district courts).
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four hundred others to keep moving-diversity, social security, civil
rights, habeas corpus, bankruptcy, patent, admiralty, and so on.
Professor Fiss may think of me as a judge-a blindfolded virgin
with sword and scales-but I am a manager at a litigation assembly
plant with a computer, printer, and Xerox machine. I supervise
data, docket clerks, law clerks, court reporters, lawyers, paralegals,
probation officers, magistrates, and masters. Legal administration is
my field. Better for me a degree in business, public administration,
or computer science than law.
The icon of the blindfolded virgin fell off my desk and broke some
years ago. To take its place, my law clerks gave me a print of an
artist's conception of Paradise Lost. It depicts "Chaos Umpire,"
who, in Milton's words, "sits, And by decision more imbroils the
fray, By which he Reigns." Since the rest of Milton's verse says that
next to Chaos Umpire stands "high Arbiter Chance [who] governs
all,"' I have placed next to Paradise Lost two photographs showing
the judges of my Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.
Professor Fiss and his friends sometimes refer to a legal opinion as
an "authoritative text" in order to connect it to other writings of the
same genus-papal bulls, constitutions, treaties, statutes, committee
reports, administrative rulings, and Biblical commands.4 In their
view, "authoritative texts" are to be distinguished from poems,
paintings, musical scores, histories, and magazine articles.
But Professor Fiss does not complain that papal bulls are written
by a Vatican bureaucrat rather than the Pope. He does not despair
that not a word of most statutes was written by a Congressman or
Senator, nor that the Commissioners of the ICC, the FTC, the SEC,
and the NLRB may not write or edit one word of opinions or rul-
ings published in their names. He does not even care that he does
not know who wrote the Books of Joshua, Judges, Isaiah, or Mala-
chi. He knows that God did not actually write the Ten Command-
ments on Sinai, but he does not care that he does not know who
wrote the Twentieth Chapter of Exodus, where the Commandments
are given as "authoritative texts."
But woe unto judges who rely too much on nameless law clerks,
staff attorneys, magistrates, and special masters. Fiss insists that
judges must either write their own opinions, or fly-speck and care-
fully edit, sentence by sentence, what goes out in their name. He
insists that the judges must understand the cases themselves and that
their opinions must be their own work. In creating their authorita-
tive texts, judges must act like poets, composers, and preachers who
write their own poems, songs, and sermons. Judges are engaged in
an aesthetic act and it would be a profanation of their office to dele-
gate the creative act to another.
3. J. MILTON, PARADISE LOST, Bk. II, lines 907-09 (London 1667).
4. See Vining, Justice, Bureaucracy, and Legal Method, 80 MICH. L. REV. 248 (1981).
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Professor Fiss does not understand that I am a manager of events,
appointed to get a job done, and that what is important is not so
much the process and the creative act but the result, the practical
consequences, the effect on society. Like senators, university adminis-
trators, newspaper publishers, and major executives, I must concen-
trate on the big picture and delegate responsibility to others to carry
out my orders. Nobody reads district court opinions these days ex-
cept the parties. Gone are the days of the poets and philosophers of
the law like Marshall, Shaw, Holmes, Hand, Cardozo, and
Traynor.
Although my phantom judge is now little more than a speck on the
horizon, we should share Owen Fiss's concern that he may be the wave of
the future5 and that the old icon of disinterested justice may be cracking.6
A few district judges talk this way from time to time. To the consternation
of many, Judge Alcee Hastings recently admitted at his trial for bribery
that he had not read the Court of Appeals' opinion on which his decision
had been based, and observed that judges often rule on the basis of clerks'
research.7 We hear stories of appellate judges who simply order the law
clerk to produce a result and do not participate in the process or shape the
reasoning of the opinion.
These judges are certainly not the norm. Most federal judges do not
want to become managers. No limousines or Lear jets come with the job.
They complain about, and delegate to others, the managerial tasks they
have to perform.
Most federal judges understand that their special place, their power in
our society, is not personal. Our authority comes from the common law
5. I doubt that some of the signs Professor Fiss points to in the federal appellate courts are really
symptoms of bureaucratic attitudes. The advent of the staff attorney, the summary affirmance, and
oral dispositions from the bench seem justified, if used within reasonable limits. These interventions
are designed to deal with a rising volume of meritless cases and motions. I do not favor imposing the
English practice of deterring meritless cases, motions, and arguments by assessing attorneys' fees
against the loser, but we must have some way to deal with the problem by screening out and quickly
deciding the easy cases so that we will have time to study carefully the difficult ones.
6. A number of other judges have recently expressed a concern about this problem. See, e.g.,
Edwards, A Judge's View on Justice, Bureaucracy, and Legal Method, 80 MICH. L. REV. 259 (1981)
(Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia); Godbold, Improvements
in Appellate Procedure: Better Use of Available Facilities, 66 A.B.A. J. 863 (1980) (Circuit Judge,
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit); Higginbotham, Bureaucracy-The Carcinoma
of the Federal Judiciarty, 31 ALA. L. REV. 261 (1980) (Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit; at time of Symposium, United States District Court Judge, Northern District of
Texas); Mikva, More Judgeships-But Not All at Once, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 23 (1982) (Cir-
cuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia); Powell, Are The Federal
Courts Becoming Bureaucracies?, 68 A.B.A. J. 1370 (1982) (Associate Justice, United States Su-
preme Court); Rubin, Bureaucratization of the Federal Courts: The Tension Between Justice and
Efficiency, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 648 (1980) (Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit).
7. N.Y. Times, Feb. 1, 1983, at A15, col. 1.
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tradition of disinterested judgment-the rational development and appli-
cation of legal principles that resolve disputes through the traditional
methods of precedent, analogy, logic, and social utility described by Car-
dozo here at Yale sixty years ago.8 Over time, managerial judges and bu-
reaucratic justice could become a pressing problem, or even a fatal illness,
for the judicial branch. In our attempt to prevent this illness, Owen Fiss
has provided a helpful theoretical framework.
II.
From my perspective, the threat of judicial bureaucracy and malfunc-
tion arises from certain aspects of the responsibility of federal courts to
restrain and remedy official abuse in the administrative state. Some statis-
tics from the Sixth Circuit set the stage for my discussion.
Sixty years ago, the Sixth Circuit had three circuit judges and decided
103 appeals. Thirty percent of those were criminal and tax appeals. The
other seventy percent were private civil cases applying law between pri-
vate individuals and corporations in diversity, patent, admiralty, and simi-
lar cases. At that time we had no so-called public interest cases, and no
section 1983 or administrative law cases or constitutional and statutory
claims asking our court to review the official actions of other government
officials and agents-federal, state, or local.'
During 1982, the eleven active and five senior judges of our court, with
the help of many district judges sitting with us by designation, decided
2000 appeals on the merits. Almost half were constitutional, administra-
tive, and statutory claims in which the court was called upon to review the
actions of other government officials and institutions. A great many were
section 1983 or constitutional tort claims in which we were asked to re-
view and invalidate some action of a state or local official.More than
twenty-five percent were meritless cases decided without oral argument.10
Twenty-five percent of the cases on the oral argument calendar raised no
substantial question and either were decided or could have been decided
from the bench.
We could discuss at length the reasons for an increase in official-
conduct cases from none sixty years ago to half of our current docket. The
short answer is that, although the population has only slightly more than
8. See B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1921) (series of lectures delivered
at Yale).
9. For Sixth Circuit cases for the year 1921, see volumes 270 through 280 of the Federal
Reporter.
10. These statistics are based on unpublished reports prepared for our court by John Hehman,
the Clerk of the Court.
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doubled," the expenditure of all governments in the United States since
the years shortly after World War I has increased more than one hundred
times.12 Civilian government employment in that period has increased
dramatically, to more than fifteen million people.13 The proliferation of
federal legislation and regulation, with its attendant increase in federal
employment, is well-known.14 The much greater proliferation of state and
local legislation, and with it state employment, is less often discussed. 5
The most pressing problem we confront as judges is the legal control of
government officials, particularly at the state and local level. As a result of
the historical development vesting jurisdiction to correct official abuse in
the civil courts,16 the courts, and now particularly the federal courts, are
major institutions for protection of the citizen against abuse by officials at
all levels of government.
Federal judicial authority to correct such abuse is broad and derives
from many sources. The forms of action allowing review of official con-
duct are many and varied-for example, direct actions in tort under the
Constitution; actions in tort and contract under sections 1983 and 1981 for
constitutional, statutory, and common law deprivations; review under the
Administrative Procedure Act and under many specialized laws governing
enviromental protection and occupational and consumer safety; and fed-
11. While the population of the United States was 106.5 million in 1920, it was 232 million in
1982. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1984, at 6 [hereinafter cited as STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES].
12. In 1922, governments at all levels spent a total of $9.297 billion. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 2 HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES 1120 [hereinafter cited
as HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES]. In 1980, governments at all levels spent $958.7
billion. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 11, at 273.
13. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 11, at 303.
14. For example, in 1922 the total staff of the federal judicial branch was 1,880. HISTORICAL
STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 12, at 1102. By 1981, that staff had increased to
15,000. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 11, at 336. In the period from
1950 to 1981, however, federal civilian employment increased only from 2.117 million to 2.865 mil-
lion. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 11, at 303.
15. State and local government employment increased from 4.285 million in 1950 to 13.103 mil-
lion in 1981. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 11, at 303.
16. In earlier centuries the evolving areas of law required the judicial branch to develop and
apply principles governing land ownership and transfer, and then to develop principles for controlling
violence through the law of crime and tort. Later still, with the rise of trade and the industrial revolu-
tion, courts had to develop principles of contract and restitution. The control of the administrative
state was not a problem that the judicial branch had to spend much time pondering.
This situation began to change, however, and the common law courts eventually "won a victory
which, on balance, we may regard as fortunate" against the administrative agencies of the Tudor
period, the Star Chamber and the High Commission. T. PLUNKETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE
COMMON LAW 197 (5th ed. 1956). Similarly, over several centuries the common law courts restricted
the activities of the network of ecclesiastical courts covering England. The common law courts rejected
the civil law concept of the droit administratif and won the right to protect the public from the abuse
of official power. See id. at 191-98 for discussion of the historical development of the common law
courts in these respects.
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eral criminal laws punishing various forms of bribery and official
corruption.
The great new challenge for the federal courts is to develop constitu-
tional, statutory, and administrative law doctrines to govern the exercise of
official power by government employees and officials. The problem is to
work out a stable system of judicial intervention which prevents the abuse
of power by officials. We have not done that yet.
More than just liberal reformers and "judicial activists" seek to enlarge
the federal judicial power to review the conduct of public officials, admin-
istrators, and legislators. Conservative reformers often adopt the same
course. Congressional enactment of a host of federal criminal laws
designed to attack official corruption at the state and local level-for ex-
ample, the Travel Act,"7 the Hobbs Act,"8 and RICO' 9-were supported
in Congress by conservatives.2"
The general causes of these proposals and the reasons that we have
more cases and more complex structural and public law cases are those
identified by Owen Fiss and Abe Chayes:2' the growth in the size and
complexity of American society, the need to restrain official abuse and
negligence, and a tendency toward centralization, unification, and nation-
alization of the legal system. In a modern, highly organized society, offi-
cial acts and decisions intimately affect the well-being and opportunities of
the citizenry, particularly those who are poor. We must have means of
ensuring that administrative action which interferes with liberty and
property does not exceed the bounds set by the Constitution and by the
legislative branch.
17. 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1982).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1982).
19. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982).
20. Another example of conservative support for proposals that would transfer new power to the
federal judiciary involves their support for the balanced budget amendment to the Constitution, which
the President proposed and is still pushing. S.J. Res. 58, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); Balancing the
Budget: Hearings Before the Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Committee on the Judi-
ciary to consider S.J. Res. 58, to propose a constitutional amendment to require a balanced Federal
budget and to limit Federal taxing and spending, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); Constitutional Amend-
ments to Balance the Federal Budget: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Monopolies and Com-
mercial Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary to consider proposals to amend the Constitu-
tion to require a balanced Federal budget or to limit Federal spending, 96th Cong. (1979-80). Under
such amendments, federal courts apparently would tell Congress and the President that taxes must be
raised and defense spending cut whenever the budget is out of balance. I say this because the federal
judicial system would, I assume, take seriously its responsibility to enforce this constitutional
provision.
21. In his seminal articles on public law litigation, Professor Chayes elaborates the point that the
"public law trend does not simply reflect the political or ideological coloration" of liberal judges but is
rooted in "changes in the larger social, political, and cultural environment." Chayes, Foreword: Public
Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (1982); see also Chayes, The Role of
the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976); Fiss, The Bureaucratization of
the Judiciary, 92 YALE L.J. 1442. (1983).
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III.
The particular problem I want to address arises in the context of sec-
tion 1983 and other similar cases against state and local officials. Specifi-
cally, at what point should the federal judicial branch intervene in the
state and local administrative process to look at what has happened and
see if there is a federal right to be enforced? Or, as lawyers and judges
would put it, when should the federal courts require the exhaustion of
state and local administrative and judicial remedies before hearing the
merits of a claim?22
The two most recent Supreme Court decisions on the subject, the Patsy
case23 and the Fair Assessment Association case,24 reflect the confusion
and instability in the law. In Patsy, the Court, in an opinion by Justice
Marshall, appears to lay down the broad no-exhaustion rule that federal
plaintiffs can complain about the actions of state and local officials with-
out exhausting any state remedies.2 5 In answer to Justice Powell's dissent
arguing that the requirement that plaintiff exhaust available and adequate
administrative remedies "is firmly established in virtually every area of
the law" and is required by "common sense, as well as by comity and
federalism," 26 Justice Marshall replies that only Congress, not the courts,
has the institutional competence to come up with a solution, given the
complexity of the policy considerations involved.27
In the Fair Assessment Association case, Justice Brennan, joined by
Justice Marshall and two other members of the Patsy majority, writes in
concurrence that the no-exhaustion rule should not operate in a range of
cases, the scope of which is unclear. Justice Brennan says that the no-
exhaustion rule does not apply where congressional intent to the contrary
is clear-a relatively simple exception. But his opinion also says that fed-
eral courts should require exhaustion of state remedies when such an in-
tent can be "fairly understood" from congressional action or is "in accord
with congressional policy."2 8
The question of when federal courts should intervene to control official
action at the state and local level under section 1983 has thus not been
resolved. My view is that many of the points made by Justice Powell in
22. See generally Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV.
1133, 1264-74 (1977) (discussing exhaustion requirement in judicial and administrative contexts);
Comment, Exhaustion of State Administrative Remedies in Section 1983 Cases, 41 U. CHI. L. REV.
537 (1974) (re-evaluating exhaustion requirement in section 1983 cases).
23. Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
24. Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100 (1982).
25. 457 U.S. at 516.
26. Id. at 536 (Powell, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 512-15.
28. 454 U.S. at 136 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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his dissenting opinion in Patsy are correct. There is no justification for
intervention in every constitutional tort and section 1983 case-the major
areas in which the explosion of federal cases during the last twenty years
has occurred-before state or local remedies have been exhausted. In the
normal section 1983 case claiming official abuse at the level of state and
local government-involving prisoners, welfare recipients, licensing, pay-
ment of taxes, illegal arrest, employment, and so on-there are state ad-
ministrative and judicial forums in which federal as well as state claims
can be raised. Why should state administrative and judicial remedies not
be exhausted before the section 1983 claim against the state or local offi-
cial is reviewed and decided in federal court? A rule requiring exhaustion
would reduce case loads, the volume of frivolous cases, and the need to
decide so many cases that turn on issues of federal jurisdiction and proce-
dure rather than on the merits.
It is puzzling to me why we should develop and enforce a fairly clear
set of exhaustion requirements in state habeas corpus cases, when a per-
son's freedom is at stake-a set of principles that require thorough ex-
haustion of state administrative and judicial remedies 29-and yet not re-
quire exhaustion for rights of lesser importance. The state prisoner
convicted of murder and sentenced to death must exhaust his state judicial
remedies. The barber who complains that the action of the local barber
board in delaying the licensing process violates a federal right, the state
employee fired without a hearing, or the state Medicaid recipient denied
benefits may come directly into federal court without exhausting state ad-
ministrative or judicial remedies. I see no valid justification for this differ-
ence in the law.
An extension of the habeas corpus doctrine of exhaustion to cases seek-
ing review of state and local official action under section 1983 would not
change or withdraw basic jurisdiction from the federal courts. It would
simply reduce the present confusion about when we should intervene and
bring clarity to the record when we do. Many more cases would be de-
cided before they reach a federal court. I suggest it as one method for
dealing with the real problem the federal courts are facing--the dramatic
rise in section 1983 and similar claims against state and local officials.30
29. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2256 (1982); see also Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982) (prisoner
forfeits constitutional claim because of failure to comply with state criminal procedure); Rose v.
Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982) (district court must dismiss habeas petitions containing both unexhausted
and exhausted claims).
30. The fundamental reason for the no-exhaustion doctrine in cases reviewing state and local
official conduct is historical. Section 1983 was passed after the Civil War to protect blacks from
official abuse in the South. The state courts were part of the problem and could not be trusted. Today
state courts are competent to adjudicate such claims. In any case, this historical basis does not even
exist in non-race cases, which constitute the vast majority of § 1983 cases today.
The Supreme Court has recently observed that state courts are competent to adjudicate federal
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An exhaustion requirement similar to the habeas corpus requirement
would not prevent the adjudication of the claim in federal court. It would
simply make use of state and local administrative and judicial bodies in
the first instance. Just as in habeas corpus cases, if the plaintiff demon-
strates that these remedies are inadequate, they need not be pursued
before bringing the federal lawsuit.
Conclusion
If bureaucracy comes to the federal courts, it will not be because we are
unable to deal with diversity, admiralty, antitrust, securities, and tradi-
tional federal question and federal administrative agency cases. It will be
because we are unable to find adequate time and methods to deal with the
volume, magnitude, and complexity of cases asking us to make a record
and then review the daily activities of millions of officials at the state and
local level. Adoption of a rule requiring exhaustion would help us deal
more effectively with this problem. It will not, as in Professor Gilmore's
description of a judicial heaven, make law unnecessary so that "the lamb
will lie down with the lion." Nor will it entirely eliminate the possibility
of the ultimate bureaucratization of the judiciary, that final judicial pur-
gatory in which "there will be nothing but law and due process will be
meticulously observed.""1 But it will help preserve for a few more years
the reign of Justicia, the blindfolded virgin, and prevent her overthrow in
Paradise Lost by Chaos Umpire, who "sits, And by decision more im-
broils the fray By which he Reigns."
claims. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 103-05 (1980). Elected state judges may, however, be unduly
responsive on controversial issues to the views of a majority of their constituents. But that problem can
be solved by modifying the present rule that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel bar
federal court review of state court judgments in § 1983 cases. See id. at 96-105 (stating present rule).
If the same exhaustion of state judicial remedies rules is applied in § 1983 cases as we now apply in
habeas corpus, we should also apply the habeas rule that the doctrine of res judicata does not bar
federal review of state court judgments. If exhaustion is required, res judicata should not be used to
bar access to the federal courts on the federal claim.
31. G. GILMORE, THE AGEs OF AMERICAN LAW 111 (1977).
1477
